Central Banks as a Bank Supervisor
A Comparison of the Function of the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank
Zusammenfassung
Stanyo Dinov analyses and compares the three most advanced and most influential financial systems in the world, their structure, models of regulation and their actual financial legislation against the background of the global financial crisis in 2007. After a brief introduction, the first chapter is devoted to the function of the Central Banks and the two main divisions theories about the role of the CBs, namely their responsibility for monetary policy, or for monetary policy and banking supervision. The work also displays the four existing regulative approaches to financial supervision: the Institutional, the Functional, the Integrated and the Twin Peaks. The main part represents and compares the Central Banks and their regulatory structure, starting with the oldest one, the BoE. The benefits and the drawbacks of the one or the other system are outlined. In the conclusion, the most important results are presented and an ideal modal solution is suggested.
Abstract
Stanyo Dinov analyses and compares the three most advanced and most influential financial systems in the world, their structure, models of regulation and their actual financial legislation against the background of the global financial crisis in 2007. After a brief introduction, the first chapter is devoted to the function of the Central Banks and the two main divisions theories about the role of the CBs, namely their responsibility for monetary policy, or for monetary policy and banking supervision. The work also displays the four existing regulative approaches to financial supervision: the Institutional, the Functional, the Integrated and the Twin Peaks. The main part represents and compares the Central Banks and their regulatory structure, starting with the oldest one, the BoE. The benefits and the drawbacks of the one or the other system are outlined. In the conclusion, the most important results are presented and an ideal modal solution is suggested.
- 15–18 1. Introduction 15–18
- 91–96 6. Conclusion 91–96
- 97–108 Bibliography 97–108
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- „... all necessary information. Arguments in favour of conducting supervi‐ sion from the CBs are: (1) the ...” „... use of information from banking policy and super‐ vision, (2) the focus on systemic risk, (3) the ...” „... technical expertise.16 In order to carry out their obligations independently, the CBs have in this case to ...”
- „... any information necessary in order for it to carry on with any of their duties under the Act. See also ...” „... the bank used its obligation as a LLR too late in order to support other banks and the stability of ...” „... information and observe all these markets. The FSA cooperated together with the BoE and the Trea‐ sury in ...”
- „... short-term inter‐ est rates and obligated the FRB to disclose certain material information, regarding certain ...” „... multitudinous from agencies and the Fed's obligation to share its supervi‐ sory and regulatory functions with ...”